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Abstract—Lattice based cryptography (LBC) stands out today
as one of the most promising types of post-quantum cryptogra-
phy, and a strong contender in the ongoing NIST post-quantum
cryptography standardisation process. LBC algorithms are ad-
vantageous due to their efficiency, versatility and the hardness of
their underlying lattice problems. In this work, the practicality of
LBC is explored by surveying one of the critical components, the
error samplers, and highlighting the challenges associated with
their efficient, secure implementation. Side channel attack (SCA)
vulnerabilities and associated countermeasures are considered,
concluding with error sampler recommendations, to aid the
practicality, security and future widespread deployment of LBC.
Index Terms—sampling, post-quantum cryptography, Gaus-
sian, lattices, lattice-based cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
Current public-key security infrastructure will soon require
a significant update, since its security may be compromised
by a scalable quantum computer in the near future. Shor’s
algorithm, running on a quantum computer, can solve the
integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in poly-
nomial time [1], on which RSA and ECC algorithms are
based. This threat has resulted in an active area of research,
known as quantum-resilient or post quantum cryptography
(PQC), providing recommendations to transition to quantum-
resistant public-key cryptography in the near future, from
academia, industry and government agencies, including NSA
and CESG [2], [3]. In 2016, NIST called for quantum-resilient
cryptographic algorithms for standardisation [4].
Of the various flavours of quantum-resilient cryptography
submitted to the NIST PQC competition, lattice-based cryp-
tography (LBC) makes the most populous class (29 out of 71
PQC schemes). LBC stands out primarily because of the algo-
rithmic hardness of the underlying lattice problems, efficient
implementations due to inherent linear algebraic operations
and extended functionality for advanced security services such
as identity-based encryption (IBE) and fully-homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE), in addition to the basic classical cryptographic
primitives (encryption, signatures, key exchange). Google has
demonstrated LBC key exchange in TLS [5].
Implementations of LBC raise several unique challenges.
None of the commonly used underlying LBC building blocks,
e.g., Discrete Gaussian samplers (DGS), fast Number Theo-
retic Transforms (NTTs) and compact cryptographic hashes,
are part of traditional asymmetric cryptography used today.
This survey focuses on the DGS used within LBC proposals.
Secure implementation of DGS is challenging, due to inherent
performance limitations and exploitable side channel vulnera-
bilities. This work surveys the requirements of error samplers
for all LBC submissions to the NIST PQC competition. We
chalk out the use of alternate schemes instead of DGS. Any
DGS side channel vulnerabilities that have led to successful
attacks are surveyed and appropriate countermeasures are
discussed. Recommendations for efficient DGS on software
and hardware platforms conclude the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Lattice-Based Primitives
Lattices are objects in n-dimensional Euclidean space char-
acterized by a regular arrangement of points. A number of
hard mathematical problems are used to construct lattice-based
schemes, such as the Short Integer Solution (SIS) or the
NTRU assumption. The most common problem is Learning
with Errors (LWE), which involves finding a vector s when
given a matrix A and a vector b = As + e where e is a small
(unknown) error vector. The absence of this noise would give
away secret information via Gaussian elimination. Discrete
Gaussian samplers (DGS) are typically employed to generate
this noise as they allow for efficient implementations, with
smaller output sizes (ciphertexts or signatures).
There are several classes of lattices: Schemes based on LWE
are known as standard lattice-based schemes. These schemes
require matrix-vector multiplication using large memories and
quadratic complexity. Ideal or ring lattice-based schemes
alternatively represent the matrix by a single row, and the
remaining rows are generated by cyclic shifts of the first row.
This reduces matrix-vector multiplication to polynomial mul-
tiplication and is memory-computation efficient. To provide a
trade-off between efficiency and security, module lattices are
introduced [6]. The difference between module over standard
lattices is that the associated module-lattice matrix has small
dimensions and the matrix coefficients are no longer simple
integers but polynomials. The security of ring and module
lattice-based schemes is based on variants of the original
mathematical problems, e.g. Ring-LWE, Module-SIS.
III. CLASSIFICATION OF LBC CANDIDATES IN THE NIST
STANDARDISATION PROCESS
Table I presents a comprehensive summary of the lattice-
based schemes submitted to the NIST PQC standardisation
process [4] and their related lattice classes. The table shows
for which key exchange (KEM)/ public key encryption (PKE)
schemes the authors claim CCA or CCA2 security in addition
to CPA security (CPA is a NIST PQC requirement). CPA
security implies that the scheme is mathematically secure
against an attacker with limited access to plaintext/ciphertext
pairs; CCA security implies that an attacker also has access
to a decryption oracle. This can be extended by assuming
an adaptive attacker (CCA2). For most submitted signature
schemes, the authors claim EUF-CMA security, which means
that a signature is existentially unforgeable under chosen-
message attacks. Thus, an attacker with access to a signing
oracle is unable to forge a valid signature of a new message.
Strong existential unforgeability under Chosen Message At-
tacks (SEUF-CMA) is an even stronger security notion that
assumes that an attacker is unable to forge a different signature
of a message that he has already seen.
IV. ERROR SAMPLERS FOR LATTICE-BASED
CRYPTOGRAPHY
The key LBC components include linear algebraic op-
erations and sampling from a discrete Gaussian-distributed
random source. In addition to traditional rejection sampling,
several other techniques have been proposed, including Cumu-
lative Distribution Table (CDT) sampling (inversion sampling),
Knuth-Yao sampling and Box Muller sampling. All schemes
have advantages depending on the target application. However,
tackling side-channel vulnerabilities is critical. Most of the
proposed PKE and KEM LBC-schemes require a DGS with a
small standard deviation (σ < 10, generally), as seen in Table
I. σ controls the dispersion of the samples from the mean and
depends on the modulus used in the LBC scheme. The three
main types of DGS featuring in the NIST LBC submissions
are:
• Knuth-Yao: The Knuth-Yao sampler is a tree-based
algorithm for sampling from non-uniform distributions by
using a minimal number of input uniform bits, close to the
entropy of the probability distribution. The scheme has
a very compact memory footprint, but needs additional
data scrambling to make the generated Gaussian samples
time-independent [7]–[10].
• CDT: The CDT sampler requires a precomputed table
of discrete Gaussian cumulative distribution function
(CDF) values and uses binary search with complexity
of log2(N) comparisons to generate a sample. The
technique offers a reasonable data footprint and inherent
constant time execution [10].
• Box-Muller: The Box-Muller transform produces a pair
of Gaussian random numbers from a pair of uniform
numbers. It generates the magnitude and phase of a
vector of which the two Cartesian coordinates are the
output Gaussian numbers [11], [12]. It requires calcula-
tion of log2, sin, cosine and consequently has platform
limitations and limited precision. For higher precision
and/or constant-time Gaussian samplers, the authors of
NTRUEncrypt and pqNTRUSign schemes recommend
using an alternate sampler [13].
An alternative way to approximate the normal distribution is
via the binomial distribution. The binomial distribution en-
ables easier, efficient sampling in constant time, in comparison
with DGS. This approximation works well for small sigmas,
as the exact distribution shape can be shown to have sufficient
security equivalence under appropriate conditions using the
Renyi divergence technique [14]. For qTESLA, Gaussian
sampling from the Bernoulli distribution, a special case of the
binomial distribution, is used for key generation [15]. DGS
techniques are used to output a variety of distributions, i.e.
discrete Gaussian, rounded continuous Gaussian, or binomial.
Efficient, side-channel resistant implementations of DGS
schemes are non-trivial and to date limited research has been
conducted. As seen in Table I, at least 9 candidates employ
DGS, using a variety of aforementioned methods, with sigmas
ranging from 1.2 to 107. Hardware designs of samplers have
explored constant-time implementations [8], [10], [16]. For
signature schemes, usually requiring large sigmas, hierarchical
CDT sampling has been proposed for compact, efficient sam-
pling in hardware [17]. Box-Muller sampling has been shown
to be efficient on software platforms and has been implemented
in constant time to produce rounded Gaussian samples for the
BLISS LBC signature scheme [12].
A. SCA vulnerabilities and countermeasures for error sam-
plers
Physical attacks against lattice-based constructions are
emerging. Physical attack resistance is also a fundamental
parameter for the NIST standardization process. Timing at-
tacks, introduced by Kocher [18], exploit the time difference
required to perform specific operations, such as the non-
constant time to execute different instructions, different data
fetch times due to cache memory hit/miss, program behaviour
due to branching, and optimisations leading to skipping of
unnecessary operations.
Discrete Gaussian samplers have been shown to be vulner-
able against timing attacks, for example information leaked
via cache memory by a CDT based Gaussian sampler has
been successfully extracted [19]. To separate the link between
timing information and sampling, Roy et. al proposed the use
of Fisher-Yates shuffling [20] with Knuth-Yao DGS [8], [9].
Saarinen [21] suggested shuffling be carried out twice on the
set of independently generated samples, before summation.
Recent research shows that relying solely on two-stage shuf-
fling may not be sufficient to protect against SCA attacks
[22]. Consequently, multiple sampling and shuffling stages
together with the use of different convolution parameters are
recommended to ensure adequate protection [22], [23].
The simplest countermeasure against timing attacks is to
ensure the execution time of an implementation is independent
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION, CONSTRUCTION AND SALIENT FEATURES OF LATTICE BASED SUBMISSIONS TO NIST PQC COMPETITION. CLASS REFERS TO ENCRYPTION AND KEY EXCHANGE AS PKE AND KEM
RESPECTIVELY. NIST SECURITY REFERS TO PARAMETER SECURITY AS DEFINED BY NIST FOR PQC STANDARDISATION, RANGING FROM 1 (EQUIVALENT TO AES128) TO 5 (EQUIVALENT TO
AES256). NOTE THAT SOME SCHEMES BASE THEIR SECURITY ON MULTIPLE ASSUMPTIONS. NOTE THAT LEPTON IS BASED ON RING-LPN. THE POLYNOMIAL LATTICES CLASS IS VERY SIMILAR TO
RING LATTICES AND FOR POWER-OF-TWO DIMENSIONS IS EQUIVALENT. CSPRNG STANDS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY SECURE PSEUDO RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR. NIST PRNG IS A STANDARD
FOR DETERMINISTIC RANDOM BIT GENERATION (DRBGS) [25]; AN ANALYSIS OF NIST DRBGS CAN BE FOUND IN [26].
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S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
R
i
n
g
M
o
d
u
l
e
P
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
P
K
E
K
E
M
S
i
g
n
a
t
u
r
e
s
NIST Security DGS/Binomial CSPRNGs/ Hashes Security
1. Lepton 4 4 1,3, 5 none SHAKE128/cSHAKE128 as XOF/PRNG IND-CCA
2. Odd Manhattan 4 4 1,3,5 none NIST PRNGs IND-CCA
3. LOTUS 4 4 4 1,2,3,4,5 DGS (Knuth-Yao), σ = 3, µ = 0 NIST PRNG, SHA-512 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA2
4. Compact-LWE 4 4 3 none NIST PRNGs IND-CCA2
5. Giophantus 4 4 1,3,5 none NIST PRNGs, SHAKE256 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA2
6. FRODO 4 4 1,5 DGS (CDT), σ = 2.3, 2.75, µ = 0 NIST PRNG, cSHAKE128/256 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA
7. DRS 4 4 1,3,5 none NIST PRNGs, SHAKE512 as XOF/Hash EUF-CMA
8. Lizard 4 4 4 4 1,3,5 DGS (CDT, 9 entries) NIST PRNGs, SHAKE512 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA
9. Round2 4 4 4 4 1,2,3,4,5 none NIST AES XOF IND-CCA KEM
10. KCL 4 4 4 4 4 3,5 Centered Binomial Distribution, k = 2 NIST PRNGs, SHA-1 as Hash IND-CCA
11. EMBLEM/ 4 4 4 4 1 DGS, (CDT, 54 entries), σ = 25 NIST PRNG, SHA-256 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA2
R. EMBLEM
12. NTRU Prime 4 4 5 Wide DGS, σ = 1.2− 1.9 NIST PRNG, SHA-512 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA2
13. NTRU Encrypt 4 4 4 1,3,5 DGS (Box-Muller) NIST PRNG (salsa20), SHA-256 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA2
14. Ding 4 4 1,3,5 DGS (CDT), σ = 2.6, 4.19 NIST PRNGs IND-CPA
15. KINDI 4 4 4 2,4,5 none NIST PRNGs, SHAKE256, SHAKE512 as XOF/Hash IND-CCA
16. LIMA 4 4 3 Centered Binomial Distribution, σ = 3.16 NIST PRNGs as XOF IND-CCA
17. NewHope 4 4 1,3 Centered Binomial Distribution NIST PRNG, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash IND-CCA
18. HILA5 4 4 5 Centered Binomial Distribution NIST PRNG, SHAKE256 as XOF/ hash IND-CCA
19. NTRU-HRSS-KEM 4 4 4 - Centered Binomial Distribution, k = 2 NIST PRNG, SHAKE128 as XOF/hash IND-CCA2
20. Mersenne 4 4 5 DGS, σ = 28.64 NIST PRNG as XOF IND-CCA
-756839
21. qTESLA 4 4 1,3,5 Bernoulli distribution, σ = 8.5, 10 cSHAKE256 as PRNG, SHA-3 as Hash EUF-CMA
22. Falcon 4 4 1,2,3,4,5 Trapdoor sampling in Fourier domain, ChaCha20, AES based NIST PRNG, SHAKE256 hash EUF-CMA
DGS-rejection sampling of bimodal distribution
23. pqNTRUSign 4 4 4 4 1 DGS (Box-Muller), σ = 107 NIST PRNG, SHA-2, SHA3-512 as hash IND-CCA2 KEM
24. CRYSTALS- 4 4 1,3,5 none NIST PRNG, SHA-3-256, SHA-3-512, IND-CCA2
Kyber SHAKE128, SHAKE512 as XOF, Hash
25. SABER 4 4 1,3,5 none NIST PRNG, SHAKE128 (as XOF), IND-CCA
SHA3-256, SHA3-512 as Hash
26. THREEBEARS 4 4 - none cSHAKE256 as PRNG, XOF and Hash IND-CCA
27. CRYSTALS- 4 4 1,2,3 none NIST PRNG, SHAKE128, SEUF-CMA
Dilithium SHAKE256 as XOF, Hash
28. Titanium 4 4 4 1,3,5 Binomial Difference Distribution KMAC256 PRNG, SHA256 as Hash IND-CCA KEM
29. LAC 4 4 4 1,3,5 Centered Binomial Distribution NIST PRNG, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 as Hash IND-CCA
of the secret data. However, for Gaussian samplers, it is often
expensive to ensure constant-time implementations. Several
algorithms utilise uniform random numbers to return Gaussian
distributed numbers and differ from each other in terms of
implementation speed, memory, and precision. Constant-time
hardware architectures for a wide range of samplers have
been proposed [10], [24]. The binomial sampler is inherently
protected against timing attacks. However, as it only samples
from a binomial distribution instead of an exact Gaussian
distribution it can only be used in encryption and key exchange
schemes, as the security proof in signature schemes requires
the sampler to have high precision.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Lattice based cryptographic primitives offer both efficiency
and resilience against quantum attacks, highlighting the poten-
tial for SCA-resilient LBC implementations to replace current
public key cryptography used today on existing commodity
and custom hardware. This work surveys the samplers in LBC
constructions, with consideration of SCA attacks that threaten
the security of these implementations. It is recommended that:
• Ensure constant time implementations where possible.
• Box-Muller sampling is a suitable DGS candidate for
software, offering efficient, constant time and scalable
performance, and does not require precomputed tables.
• CDT sampling is a suitable DGS candidate for hardware,
offering efficient, constant time and scalable performance,
using precomputed tables.
• Knuth-Yao sampling is compact DGS candidate for hard-
ware, but is inherently non- constant time. Scrambling
can address this, incurring performance costs.
• Binomial sampling is a suitable sampling candidate for
low sigma applications, and it runs in constant time.
• Multiple threat vectors should be considered together: to
date, most SCA countermeasures for samplers address a
specific threat, without consideration of other threats.
• Performance overheads of countermeasures should be
considered to accurately assess LBC performance.
As more lattice-based designs emerge, further attacks will
most likely surface and this will continue to be an important
area of research.
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